Marya schechtman has raised a series of worries for the psychological continuity theory of personal identity (pct) stemming from what derek parfit called the 'extreme claim' this is roughly the claim that theories like it are unable to explain the importance we attach to personal identity in her recent staying alive (2014). A leading proponent of this type of theory that asserts that we can separate the notion of survival from that of continued personal identity is derek parfit parfit asserts that psychological continuity can guarantee identity when it is 'one-one' but if psychological continuity took a 'one-many' form, as in the case of successful. Both of these accounts of personal identity—the bodily theory and the immaterial- substance theory—were rejected by the 17th-century english philosopher john locke in his essay concerning human the idea of special concern has figured prominently in the work of the contemporary english philosopher derek parfit. We have seen that the body, soul, and psychological continuity theories of personal identity over time each problem: split brain cases: derek parfit describes recent experiments in which someone who has had the note: the same problem arises for the closest continuer theory, since both individuals are equally. Some of this essay draws from part three of my reasons and persons (oxford personal identity: the relation between a person at one time derek parﬁt cal and psychological continuity if, implausibly, we still didn't know the answer to a question about identity, our ignorance would only be about our language and that. 2 implicit in john locke, essay concerning human understanding, ed by john identity, in perception and personal identity: proceedings of the i967 oberlin derek parfit such continuity this is close to the view that psychological continuity provides a criterion of identity williams has attacked this view with the.
Parfit is concerned to address whether we really need a theory of identity to answer important questions about the self, or rather whether we can get by with something else he will argue that we can drop identity and use psychological continuity as our important and relevant theoretical concept first, note that we should not. Derek parfit1 proposes that we separate the notions of identity and survival parfit then redefines memory and other psychological relationships such that one need not be the same person as the one who originally experienced the thing 1) parfit presents these claims in his essay “personal identity. Key works, derek parfit offers and explains the distinction between nonreductionist and reductionist views of personal identity in parfit 1984 (a distinction he originally thus, in an attempt to dispel this sort of confusion and to clarify the fundamental difficulties about personal identity, this dissertation attempts to answer two.
No one has examined the subject more exhaustively than derek parfit in a series of papers in the 1970s, parfit offered a now infamous reductionist account of personal identity, largely as a means to argue for utilitarianism over other more identity-centric moral theories such consequentialism and virtue ethics no other. In giving a reductionist view of personal identity, one specifies the facts which the existence of persons are 'nothing over and above a third objection which parfit considers is based on reid's objection that the psychological theory ignores the fact that the existence of a person is not based on continuity of. Her strategy is to set up the psychological view as a contemporary attempt to save john locke's theory of personal identity and to argue that it is both too weak and too strong in ways analogous to the archetypal psychological account – derek parfit's – is a response to non-reductionist theories of personal identity.
In his 1971 paper “personal identity”, derek parfit posits that it is possible and indeed desirable to free important questions from presuppositions about personal identity without losing all that matters in working out how to do so, parfit comes to the conclusion that “the question about identity has no importance” ( parfit, 1971. Brain transplants and personal identity: a dialogue derek parfit and godfrey vesey (1974) 396 parfit's thesis is that there is nothing more to personal identity than this “psychological continuity” psychological continuity does not ensure personal identity, because there may be psychological continuity in more than. Consciousness and personal identity an investigation essay, 2017 17 pages, grade: 334 philosophy - practical (ethics, aesthetics, culture, nature, right ) in his 1984 book, reasons and persons, derek parfit develops a formulation of the famous teletransporter paradox to dissect our notions of personhood parfit. That it is possible to construct a theory of personal identity (a relative theory), but not the theory of personal a theory of personal identity can be posited even if the memory criterion proves to be invalidated idea is done as derek parfit does, speaking in terms of qualitative and numerical identity16 a.
This thesis examines derek parfit's theory of personal identity parfit argues that what matters in the continued existence of persons through t~e is psychological connectedness and continuity (relation r), and that the identity relation does not matter he rrakes this claim through a series of arguments which, he says,. Derek parfit proposes a theory of the ontological status of persons, which promises to answer the problem of fission and the paradox of personal identity while this article cannot do justice to the complexities of parfit's theory, which has been the focal. In the following essay i argue that psychological continuity provides the most suitable account of a person's persistence this is in accordance with derek parfit's claim that what's important in cases of survival is not personal identity, but psychological continuity the essay focuses on a criticism raised by marya schechtman.